In 878, Alfred experienced perhaps the most significant set-back of his reign followed by one of his greatest triumphs.
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limitations of the main sources, a key reason for the prevalence of a West Saxon perspective on the Fulham Vikings in particular seems to be an unstated but persistent assumption that the Vikings who arrived at Fulham in 878 constituted a major army.
This must be the implication of Stenton's description of the event, in which the army seems to be fully assembled before entering the Thames, 6 and indeed two centuries ago Turner (1836, 575) described the Vikings that arrived at Fulham as 'a large fleet of Northmen'. 7 The assumption that the Fulham army was a sizeable and formidable foe already in 878 surely underpins the analyses of other scholars who view the movements of the Fulham force as part of a direct interplay with Alfred -its arrival a threat to his position; its departure a mark of his triumph. This is far from being an untenable position in relation to the written sources, but, as is discussed below, a more nuanced interpretation is possible and perhaps preferable.
Although the broad chronology of these events is well established, their full significance depends on our reading of the contemporary or near-contemporary accounts, both textual and archaeological; and on an interpretation of the strategic 6 'Before Guthrum's army had completed that occupation of East Anglia,
another Viking force was coming together in northern waters. In the autumn of 878 this new army entered the Thames and took winter quarters at Fulham' (Stenton 1971, 257) . 7 'A large fleet of Northmen arrived in the Thames, who joined Godrun, as if desirous to unite with him in a new warfare; but, Alfred having pacified his ambition, these adventurers found no encouragement to continue here. They wintered at Fulham, and then followed their leader, the famous Hastings, into Flanders; and remained a year at Ghent.' 6 landscape of Mercia and Wessex. The assumption that a significant army of Vikings arrived in the Thames in 878, and therefore the assumption that it directly threatened Alfred and Wessex, fail to take full account of the range of evidence available. In fact, the key narrators of the events of late 878 seem to be in disagreement about the nature of the Viking army that set up camp at Fulham, and no account of the latter's interaction with Guthrum, Alfred, or the Mercians can properly progress without careful appraisal of the relevant texts and an evaluation of their conflicting reports.
Furthermore, careful analysis of the material remains left by the Vikings can help to provide a more nuanced appreciation of their activities (e.g. Brooks and GrahamCampbell 1986) , especially given recent advances in available data brought about by the Portable Antiquities Scheme.
The present discussion employs a fully multidisciplinary approach to understanding the manoeuvres of the Fulham Vikings, taking textual, linguistic, archaeological, and topographical evidence into consideration, and setting the arrival and positioning of that war-band into a clear strategic framework. It gives greater emphasis to the Chronicle's account than has sometimes been the case, establishes the archaeological evidence for Vikings in the Fulham area, and analyses the landscape setting and military potential of the location, attempting to redefine the threat faced by the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms in light of these. A fresh consideration of the nature of the Fulham force sits more naturally within a framework that places Mercia, rather than Wessex, at the centre of events.
Characterizing the Viking Force at Fulham
A crucial element to any appraisal of the Vikings at Fulham is an understanding of the nature of their force, especially its size. In this respect, as should be expected, 7 archaeological and onomastic approaches can add little. According to the Chronicle, the Vikings remained at Fulham only for about a year, as an encamped army rather than as colonizing settlers. This is unlikely to have been enough time to leave an indelible mark on local toponymy. 8 At the same time, identified archaeological remains are at present insufficient for an estimate of the community's size. However, it may be possible to assess the nature of the force by a detailed consideration of the Fulham Vikings in ninth-and tenth-century consciousness.
At first glance, it seems clear that the Viking war-band ensconced at Fulham at Christmas 878 was a large expeditionary force. Asser, writing of its arrival, emphasizes the size of the Viking army, which he calls magnus paganorum exercitus, literally 'a great army of pagans', presumably in other words 'a great Viking army' (Stevenson 1959, 47; Keynes and Lapidge 1983, 85 (1986, .
This is a term very rarely used in the Chronicle. Rather than being a way of identifying Scandinavians by nationality, wicing seems to have been used to distinguish piratae from an exercitus, in other words groups of pirates from larger war-bands.
As Fell noted, choice of the word hlōþ may also be significant, here employed rather than the more usual here, which is used to describe Guthrum's army at Cirencester, and, as we have seen, the Fulham Vikings on their departure. This point is worth pursuing. OE hlōþ is a term with several possible meanings, including 'a band, a company of people' (Bosworth and Toller 1898; Roberts and Kay 1995, 1082) , 12 and it is used again in the Chronicle to describe the Viking bands active in Kent in 893. 13 The sense there is certainly one of small groups of armed men rather than of large armies (Earle and Plummer 1892, 84; Swanton 1996, 84) .
The Old English Orosius, which probably comes from a similar scholarly milieu to the '890 Chronicle' (Bately 1980, xciii) , uses hlōþ three times. The phrase 11 Here the A text is closely followed by B, C, D and E (Taylor 1983, 37; O'Brien O'Keeffe 2001, 62; Cubbin 1996, 27; Irvine 2004, 51) . Under the following year, the Latin of the bilingual MS F states: 'Piratę qui iacebant ad Fuleham transeunt mare et ueniunt usque ad Gent et ibi morantur per annum integrum' (Baker 2000, 72) . 12 The term is also used of 'booty, spoils' and 'wrongful taking, theft' (Roberts and Kay 1995, 1082) , and occurs in various compound nouns.
13 Earle and Plummer 1892, 84. A is followed in its usage by B, C, and D (Taylor 1983, 41; O'Brien O'Keeffe 2001, 66; Cubbin 1996, 31) .
containing the first example, 'hloðum on hie staledon' (Bately 1980, 55, ll. 18-21 The word hlōþ was also used in the law-code attributed to Ine specifically to define a group of bandits not more than thirty-five in number (Liebermann 1903, 94) , from which Sawyer controversially argued that a here might be of very limited size (Sawyer 1962, 120 in at least three of these the context suits a sense 'band, company'. 14 There is therefore reason to believe that hlōþ could apply to a smaller band of people, and in two instances -one legal, one poetic -it is used specifically in contrast to the term here.
Where the size of Viking fleets is given in numbers, the accuracy of the Chronicle's estimates has been robustly defended (Brooks 1979, 2-9) , and although terminology may have a more nuanced usage than numerals, it is possible that a scribe's choice of words reflects knowledge of the relative size or status of Viking war-bands. Abels (2003) , for example, has argued that the chroniclers' use of the term here to describe Viking armies has specific connotations, contrasting with the 14 Bradley translates 'throngs' (hloþum), 'the crew of men' (secga hloþe) and 'in swarms' (hloþum) in Guthlac, Juliana, and Soul and Body respectively (1982, 271, 318, 361) . The other two instances (one in the poem Christ, the other in the Old English Bede) may carry the sense 'booty' or 'spoil', rather than 'band of people' (Bradley 1982, 236; Miller 1999, 70 'no-man's land' (Gover, Mawer, and Stenton 1942, 102, 105) . The names may be
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It is easy to overlook this account as an aberration and to give priority to the more widely shared assessment of the size of the Fulham force -that is to say, that it was a major army. There are two very good reasons, however, why this lone contradictory voice should be heard. Firstly, as has been demonstrated, the language of this annal seems so specific in its implication, that it is hard to imagine that the scribe responsible did not intend to propound the view that the Fulham Vikings arrived at first as a small band. Secondly, of all the sources for this event, the '890
Chronicle' is closest to the action both temporally and spatially.
In one sense, the accounts can be reconciled quite easily. The discrepancy with the subsequent annal in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle and with the continental witnesses is easily overcome if it is assumed that the first Viking arrivals at Fulham were small in number, but were in the process of recruiting; by the time they departed the following year, and certainly by the time they reached Francia, they were indeed numerous. We know that the personnel of this Viking host changed over the ensuing decade and a half (Smyth 1995, 116; Abels 2003, 275) , and there is no reason to assume that its composition was stable between 878 and 879. As already stressed, the implied sense of the 879 entry, covering the events of late 878, is that Viking warriors were gathering near Fulham; by the time they departed for Ghent, they seem to have been a formidable host, but in 878 it may indeed have been little more than a gang of indicative of a local tradition of neutral ground and public assembly, and therefore perhaps also of military muster. It is impossible to say if this tradition goes further back than the fourteenth century, but it would not be the only time that a Viking force camped at an established Anglo-Saxon site of assembly (cf. 1006 ASC and S 1454; Gelling 1973-76, 481-82; Reynolds 1999, 80 
Archaeology of the Fulham Vikings
In assessing the scale of the Viking war-party at Fulham it is useful to consider (Griffiths 2010, 30-32) .
In both Kentish cases archaeological evidence for a Viking camp is equivocal, 1908, 379-99; Dyer 1972; Richards 1991, 23) ; indeed this design appears to have been utilized also by English forces during the late ninth and early tenth centuries (Dyer 1972, 226; Rodwell 1993, 77-80) .
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Yet more confusion surrounds the Viking camp at Milton. Peddie (1999, 175) critiques the generally-held assumption identifying the camp with the earthworks at Castle Rough, 2km north-east of the present-day settlement. This small rectangular site has been shown through excavation to be a moated and fortified manor house of 13 th -or 14 th -century date (Mills 1973 showed it to have been recut on four successive occasions, suggesting that it was a relatively long-lived defensive stratagem, the precise originator for which remains unknown.
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An extension of the policy of fortified bases on major waterways was that of using offshore and estuarine islands as over-wintering sites; a strategy pursued by forces which were -presumably -middling in size, at Dublin from 841, Noirmoutier Office authorities (1903, . According to Allcroft, these defences originally ran for c.853m from Rampart Street in the north to include visible ditch remnants in the west and south (1908, 338) . At this point the bank was some 2.4m high with a shallow ditch of c. 12m width. The First Edition O.S. map does not show this feature, but there remains a hint of a D-shaped planform in the street morphology of Shoebury.
Evidence for Viking defences on the isles of Mersea and Thanet is lacking.
It should be noted that Iron Age antecedents are possible for at least some of the D-shaped enclosures listed by Dyer, and accepted uncritically by Richards. In particular, the large and more complex circuit of Wimblington (Figure 1) (Gover, Mawer, and Stenton 1942, 101; cf. Gelling and Cole 2000, 49) . Late medieval and modern local toponymy is also characteristic of a marshland environment. The Eights, an earlier name for the Palace grounds, is derived by Féret (probably correctly) from
ModE ait (ME aeite, OE ēgeð) 'an island' (1900, 144; cf. Smith 1956, 148) . The fieldnames le Fen (1271), Stroda (1189-99), and Cherloumersh (1489) are also relevant (Gover, Mawer, and Stenton 1942, 215 , who connect these with Fan Meadow, Stroud
Mead, and Charley Mead).
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As some have emphasized (e.g. Dumville 1992, 5-6; Abels 1998, 163; Haslam 2006, 125) (Jones 1982, 190; Jones 2010, 44) Evidence from the London mints suggests that Alfred held the city in the mid to late 870s (Blackburn 1998, 118-20) and had perhaps done so ever since the demise of his kinsman Burgred. Towards the end of the 870s, London seems to have switched back to Mercian control, with Ceolwulf minting coins in his own name there (Blackburn 1998, 116-23 (Gover et al 1934, 121; Smith 1928, xlv) . If a similar ford across the Thames existed, its name has been lost; and it is perhaps best to assume no ford. This may be negative evidence, but the great number of fords recorded further up the Thames in charters and place-names can be compared with the plethora of local place-names in OE hӯð 'landing place' around Egham, such as The Hythe (huþe) and The Glanty (Glenthuþe), both first mentioned in a charter of 672x674 (13 th , S 1165) along with the lost wealas huþe, 24 which rather suggest that travel on the Thames at this point normally required a vessel of some kind. The archaeological and environmental evidence discussed above also suggests that the Thames in the vicinity of the Viking encampment was traversable only by ferry, rather than by ford.
In fact, the prelude to Viking attacks on Wessex south of the Thames was usually a Viking landing -or relocation -within West Saxon territory on that side of 24 The fords around Wallingford are discussed by Dewey 2009, 18-19; these and other river foot-crossings are also discussed in Anderson 1939, 216; Gelling 1953-54, 19, 186, 327; 1973-76, 392, 400-01, 446-47, 507, 527-28, 531-32, 535-36, 731, 754; Gover et al 1939, 42; Smith 1964, 38, 40; Watts 2004, 168 . For the hӯð names, which are in fact relatively common along the length of the middle and lower
Thames, see e.g. Gover et al 1934, 27-8, 121-22; Gover et al 1942, 85- or to prevent easy access from the estuary to the southern road network (Southwark). Shaw 1963, 213, 218) , and also posed difficulties for Louis the Pious at the Rhine in 839, according to the Annals of St Bertin (Nelson 1991, 41 and terra seem to have been more or less synonymous (Latham 1965, 477-78, 481) .
In other words, although it is possible that AEthelweard intended to signify the lands around Fulham, it seems equally plausible that he meant the area of England to which Guthrum had retreated. (Brooke and Keir 1975, 16-17; Hill 1981, 148, figs. 238-41; Yorke 1990, 46-47; Bailey 1994, 129-31; Taylor 2004, 11-12 (Hearne 1723, 242; Stenton 1958, 372; Dumville 1976, 29-31 fn3; Keynes 1998, 12-13) . Whether he abdicated, died, or was killed is unclear, and any of these scenarios is possible (Keynes 1998, 13-14; Walker 2000, 74) .
fleet that landed at Fulham had designs exclusively (if at all) on Wessex, and strong reasons to suppose that its primary targets were Mercian.
Conclusions
The This multidisciplinary approach allows us to draw several key conclusions.
Firstly, it is probably misleadingly simplistic to talk of the Viking party that arrived in 878 as if it were already the major military force it would subsequently become. It would of course be dangerous to place too much weight on an interpretation of the term hlōþ, but it certainly could connote a force of limited size and the language of the 879 annal as a whole seems compatible with such a sense. It is worth noting that a gathering force would have presented a different order of threat from an already established one; more vulnerable and less imposing at the outset, it would have been easier for local counter-measures to be put in place before it became a major menace. Putney (if it still existed at all in the ninth century) was only a minor arterial route.
Fulham did allow the Vikings to gain access to the Silchester Road (Margary 4a), but given the difficulties of the Staines crossing at this time, the main purpose of this route -at least in military use -must have been for traffic to join the bundle of trackways through the Goring Gap (Margary X39, X21) and to the west.
Thirdly, later testimony, perhaps drawing on contemporary sources, actually places the activities of the Fulham Vikings north of the Thames. This seems perfectly rational in light of the two previous points. The choice of Fulham as a base makes more sense within a landscape context and against the background of recorded Viking activity, if the intention was to raid north of the Thames rather than to the south.
Moreover, the timing of the Viking arrival is incompatible with a West Saxon target, coming some months after Alfred's reassertion of his authority; but is logical if the opportunities the war-band sought lay north of the Thames in Mercia.
What this event appears to confirm is that Viking forces needed to be both militarily and politically attuned to the subtleties of late Anglo-Saxon physical and social geography. However threatening they may appear to modern eyes, by wintering at Fulham the Viking war-band seems deliberately to have adopted policies designed to avoid directly threatening West Saxon interests and thereby provoking a military response. One reason for this is perhaps that they were too small in number in 878 to contemplate in all seriousness taking on the West Saxons; another reason is probably that rich pickings were to be had much more easily in a politically unstable Mercia. In essence, the events were played out principally against a Mercian and continental background, rather than a West Saxon one.
